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Abstract
We study a sequential Bertrand game with one dominant market incumbent
and multiple small entrants selling homogeneous products. Whilst the equi-
librium for the case of a single entrant is well-known from Gelman and Salop
(1983), we derive properties of the N -firm equilibrium and present an algo-
rithm that can be used to calculate this equilibrium. Using this algorithm
we derive the exact equilibrium for the cases of two and three small entrants.
For more than three entrants only approximate results are possible. We use
numerical results to gain further understanding of the equilibrium for an in-
creasing number of firms and in particular for the case where N diverges to
infinity. Similarly to the two-firm Judo equilibrium, we see that a capacity
limitation for the small firms is necessary to achieve positive profits.
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1. Introduction
Gelman and Salop (1983) show that in a sequential Bertrand competition be-
tween one entrant and a single market incumbent selling non-differentiated
products, capacity limitation is necessary for the entrant to be accommo-
dated. For the market incumbent it is beneficial to serve the residual market
at a high (residual) monopoly price rather than cutting down the price for
all customers. Because the small entrant uses the incumbent’s large size to
its own advantage — it is somewhat bound to serve its large customer base
at a single price — this entry strategy is called Judo economics (Gelman and
Salop, 1983).
This theoretical result has been confirmed by various studies found in the
economic literature. Thomas (1999) finds empirical evidence for successful
Judo-type entrants in a various branches. Using a controlled laboratory ex-
periment, Cracau and Sadrieh (2013) show that Judo limitation is a powerful
tool for entrants in different market environments including multiple incum-
bents and a cost advantage for the entrant. Theoretical work has elaborated
the original setting and introduced dynamics (Sørgard, 1995), an altered se-
quence of capacity and pricing decisions (Allen et al., 2000), or asymmetric
firms (Cracau, 2013).
In this article, we study the extension of Judo limitation of a single en-
trant to a market situation with multiple entrants. Such a Judo-type setting
with a market incumbent and multiple capacity-limited competitors can, for
example, account for the competition among airlines on certain flight routes.
We start by reviewing the basic game of Gelman and Salop (1983) with a
single entrant, before we present some properties of the general N -firm equi-
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librium. We hope to contribute to the existing literature of extensions of
duopoly markets to oligopolies. In particular, we compare our outcomes to
a number of extensions for the sequential game of von Stackelberg (1934),
e.g. presented in Boyer and Moreaux (1986), Robson (1990), Anderson and
Engers (1992).
2. Model preliminaries
We study N firms in a sequential Bertrand competition with firms i =
1 . . . N − 1 being the first moving entrants and firm i = N being the last
moving market incumbent.
Assumption 1. Market entrants move in lexicographic order, with firm i+1
making its choice after firm i.
Without this assumption, i.e. with a simultaneous price competition between
multiple small entrants, the Bertrand outcome would emerge and no small
entrant could achieve a positive profit.
Assumption 2. Products are homogeneous. Consumers’ valuation of prod-
ucts is W > 0.
Assumption 3. Total market demand D > 0 is fixed.
In the first phase of the game, the market entrants i = 1, . . . , N − 1 decide
one after another on their prices 0 < pi ≤ W and a capacity 0 < ki ≤ D.
In the second phase, the incumbent decides on its price 0 < pN ≤ W and
its output is adjusted according to the (residual) demand at its chosen price.
This is equivalent to assuming that the incumbent has no capacity limitation,
due to its dominant position in the considered market.
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Assumption 4. Consumers’ preferences are lexicographic, i.e consumers
buy from the firm with the lowest price. In case of equal prices, later moving
firms are preferred.
Under Assumptions 2– 4 and efficient rationing, firms’ sales si depend on the
decisions of all firms as well as on the market parameters.
Assumption 5. Firms face symmetric cost
κ(si) = Csi + F ,
where 0 ≤ C < W denotes constant marginal production costs and F ≥ 0
denotes fixed market entry costs.
Firms maximise their total profit πi = pisi − κ(si) = (pi − C) si − F . We
restrict our analysis to subgame perfect equilibria, i.e. if an entrant decides
to enter, he will play the subgame perfect price-capacity pair (depending on
the number of other entrants). This implies that competitors only enter if
they achieve a non-negative profit πi ≥ 0.
3. The basic Judo equilibrium with two firms
Let us first consider the case N = 2, i.e. a market environment with one
small entrant and one dominant market incumbent. As we use a fixed market
demand D, this setting is a special case of the general 2-firm Judo setting
discussed in Gelman and Salop (1983).
It is easy to see that any plausible decision of the small entrant (Firm 1)
will include a capacity limitation, i.e. k1 < D. In the case k1 = D, the
incumbent firm will always match the small entrant’s price (p2 = p1) because
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it would be left with zero profits otherwise. Due to Assumption 3, this
would leave the entrant with zero profits. The small entrant can therefore
never obtain positive profits without a capacity limitation. If capacity is
limited, the small firm chooses a price-capacity pair in a way that ensures
that the dominant incumbent is better off accommodating entry by serving
the residual demand at a high price rather than deterring the small firm’s
entry by matching its price.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1– 5, the equilibrium price and capacity
choices with one entrant and one incumbent satisfy
p1 =
W + C
2
, k1 =
D
2
, p2 = W .
Proof. Knowing the small entrant’s price p1 and capacity k1, the dominant
firm may either match the small firm’s price (p2 = p1) or accommodate
(p2 > p1). In the first case, the dominant firm serves the entire market at
the price p1 and has a profit of
πmatch2 = (p1 − C)D − F . (1)
In the second case, the dominant firm serves only the residual demand and
therefore maximises its profit by choosing the maximum price p2 = W . The
corresponding profit is
πaccom2 = (W − C) (D − k1)− F . (2)
Since the small firm has to ensure that entry is accommodated, it must choose
a price-capacity pair (p1, k1) that satisfies the condition
πmatch2 ≤ πaccom2 ,
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i.e. the dominant firm’s profit from accommodation is not smaller than
its profit from deterrence. Substituting the profits and solving for k1, this
condition takes the form
k1 ≤
(
1− p1 − C
W − C
)
D . (3)
Then, the small firm faces an optimisation problem of the form
π1(p1, k1) = (p1 − C)k1 − F → max (4)
w.r.t. k1 ≤
(
1− p1 − C
W − C
)
D .
Gelman and Salop (1983) show that the constraint (3) holds with equality
in equilibrium. Using this, one can explicitly solve the optimisation problem
to find
p1 =
W + C
2
, k1 =
D
2
, p2 = W .
The equilibrium profits of the firms are
π1 =
(W − C)D
4
− F ,
π2 =
(W − C)D
2
− F (> π1) .
Assuming F ≤ 1
4
(W −C)D, the market outcome therefore is the Judo equi-
librium as derived in Gelman and Salop (1983). Neglecting fixed cost, the
small entrant earns half the profits of the market incumbent, who earns
half the monopoly profits. If the fixed cost exceed the critical value Fcrit =
1
4
(W − C)D, the small entrant cannot cover its market entry cost and will
thus stay out of the market. In this case, the dominant incumbent remains
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the sole firm in the market earning monopoly profits. In either case, being
the (last moving) incumbent firm comes along with a strategic advantage
and results in higher profits.
4. Judo economics in an N -firm oligopoly
Let us now consider the full case with N firms that move sequentially ac-
cording to the preliminaries presented in Section 2. We aim to derive an
equilibrium that guarantees a positive profit for every firm i = 1, . . . , N . We
begin by stating some observations that directly follow from this assumption
of positive profits.
Lemma 1. In an N-firm oligopoly as described in Section 2, the following
conditions have to be true for every equilibrium that guarantees positive profit
for every firm:
C < pi < W , i = 1, . . . , N − 1 (5)
pN = W , (6)
N−1∑
i=1
ki < D . (7)
Proof. Because every firm earns a positive profit, no firm can be undercut
(or matched) by the market incumbent, as the incumbent does not have a
capacity constraint and would satisfy all the (residual) demand at its chosen
price. Similarly, no firm (including the incumbent) can play a price higher
than W , as there is no demand for these prices. Therefore, the price of
every firm i = 1, . . . , N − 1 has to be lower than W and higher than C. As
explained, we also have pN > pi, i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and therefore the optimal
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choice for firm N is pN = W . Similarly, this implies condition (7), as the
market incumbent would not make a positive profit with its price choice if
this condition was not satisfied.
Using Lemma 1, we can show a further property of the price choices.
Lemma 2. In an equilibrium with positive profits for the N-firm oligopoly de-
scribed in Section 2, the prices pi of all firms are ordered in a non-decreasing
way, i.e.
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pN−1 < pN .
Proof. This property can be easily shown by induction, with the base case
i = 1 trivially satisfied. Assume therefore that the next moving firm is firm
i (i > 1) and that all the prices so far picked are optimally chosen and non-
decreasingly sorted, i.e. p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pi−1 < W . Firm i now calculates
its optimal price and capacity choice (pi, ki). The choice of a price pi < pi−1
cannot be optimal in this setting, as choosing pi = pi−1 < W would always
result in a higher profit, as we know from Lemma 1 that in equilibrium no
firm is undercut by the incumbent and therefore always sells its full capacity.
Therefore, we have pi ≥ pi−1 and by induction the argument holds for all
i = 2, . . . , N . For pN we can additionally rule out equality as was shown in
Lemma 1.
Using Lemma 2, we can now derive the exact form of the equilibrium using
backwards recursion.
Theorem 2. In equilibrium, the capacity choice of firm i satisfies
ki = Pi(pi)
(
D −
i−1∑
j=1
kj
)
,
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where Pi : R → R is a polynomial of degree N − i. Its optimal price choice
is given through
p∗i = argmax
p<p∗i+1
(p− C)Pi(p) .
Proof. We will show this theorem by induction. Let us therefore begin by
studying the two possible options of firm N . Matching its predecessor’s price
yields
πmatN = (pN−1 − C)
(
D −
N−2∑
j=1
kj
)
whereas choosing to serve residual demand yields
πresN = (W − C)
(
D −
N−1∑
j=1
kj
)
.
In equilibrium firm N − 1 has to ensure that both options yield the same
profit (Gelman and Salop, 1983):
(pN−1 − C)
(
D −
N−2∑
j=1
kj
)
= (W − C)
(
D −
N−1∑
j=1
kj
)
.
Hence,
kN−1 =
W − C − pN−1 + C
W − C
(
D −
N−2∑
j=1
kj
)
=
(
1− pN−1 − C
W − C
)(
D −
N−2∑
j=1
kj
)
= PN−1(pN−1)
(
D −
N−2∑
j=1
kj
)
.
We will now consider the equilibrium choices of a general firm 1 < i < N .
Let us assume that the price and quantity choice of firm i has to satisfy
ki = Pi(pi)
(
D −
i−1∑
j=1
kj
)
,
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where Pi is a polynomial of degree N − i and that its optimal price choice is
p∗i+1. Then firm i has again two possible options: it can match the price of
firm i− 1 and gain the profit
πmatchi = (pi−1 − C)Pi(pi−1)
(
D −
i−2∑
j=1
kj
)
.
Alternatively it can choose to accommodate firm i − 1 by choosing a price
higher than pi−1. It then faces the optimisation problem
πaccomi = max
p<p∗i+1
(p− C)Pi(p)
(
D −
i−1∑
j=1
kj
)
. (8)
Let us call the optimiser of optimisation problem (8) p∗i . As the capacities
kj are multiplicative in this optimisation problem, they do not influence the
position of the maximum. Hence, p∗i is independent of all choices made before
player i. In equilibrium the two possible options of firm i need to yield the
same profit:
(pi−1 − C)Pi(pi−1)
(
D −
i−2∑
j=1
kj
)
= (p∗i − C)Pi(pi∗)
(
D −
i−1∑
j=1
kj
)
Hence,
ki−1 =
(
1− (pi−1 − C)Pi(pi−1)
(p∗i − C)Pi(p∗i )
)(
D −
i−2∑
j=1
kj
)
= Pi−1(pi−1)
(
D −
i−2∑
j=1
kj
)
.
where we define the polynomial Pi−1 through
Pi−1(p) = 1− (p− C)Pi(p)
(p∗i − C)Pi(p∗i )
, (9)
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and p∗i is given by
p∗i = argmax
p<p∗i+1
(p− C)Pi(p) . (10)
Note that the degree of polynomial Pi−1 is equal to the degree of Pi plus one.
Using the natural initialisation for the Nth player
p∗N = W , PN(p) = 1 , (11)
it is easy to see that Pi is a polynomial of degree N − i. Therefore the
optimisation problem to determine p∗i becomes increasingly difficult as i de-
creases.
From the proof of Theorem 2, we can device an algorithm to calculate the
N -firm Judo equilibrium for the game presented in Section 2. This algo-
rithm is presented in Table 1. Note that the backwards recursion used in
both the proof of Theorem 2 and the algorithm implies that the polynomials
and therefore the price choices when read from the last-moving player are
independent of the number of firms N in the market. However, the quantity
choices depend strongly on the number of players, as will be discussed in
Section 6.
5. Example: Judo economics with a second small firm
In order to demonstrate the algorithm to calculate the N -firm Judo equi-
librium (S1)–(S6), we study the case N = 3. Let us therefore initialise the
algorithm as in (S1):
P3(p) = 1 , p
∗
3 = W .
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(S1) Initialise the polynomial PN(p) = 1 and p
∗
N = W . Set i = N .
(S2) Recursively calculate the polynomials
Pi−1(p) = 1− (p− C)Pi(p)
(p∗i − C)Pi(p∗i )
.
(S3) Calculate p∗i−1 using
p∗i−1 = argmax
p<p∗i
(p− C)Pi−1(p) .
Set i = i− 1. If i > 1 continue with (S2).
(S4) Initialise the capacity k1 = P1(p
∗
1)D. Set i = 2.
(S5) Recursively calculate the capacities
ki = Pi(p
∗
i )
(
D −
i−1∑
j=i
kj
)
.
Set i = i+ 1. If i < N continue with (S5).
(S6) Calculate the equilibrium profits of firms i = 1, . . . , N − 1 using
πi = (p
∗
i − C)ki and of the market incumbent using
πN = (W − C)
(
D −
N−1∑
j=1
kj
)
.
Table 1: Algorithm to calculate the Judo equilibrium for N firms.
We can now calculate P2(p) using (S2)
P2(p) = 1− p− C
W − C .
12
The optimisation problem for firm 2 can be formulated according to (S3)
max
p<W
p− C − (p− C)
2
W − C .
We can easily calculate the maximiser of this optimisation problem to be
p∗2 =
W + C
2
,
which, as noted before, is the same price choice as that of player 1 in the two
player game. We can repeat these steps to calculate P1(p) and p
∗
1:
P1(p) = 1− 4 p− C
W − C + 4
(
p− C
W − C
)2
, p∗1 =
W + 5C
6
.
Using (S4) and (S5) we can calculate the equilibrium capacities
k1 = P1(p
∗
1)D =
4D
9
,
k2 = P2(p
∗
2)(D − k1) =
5D
18
.
Similarly, we can calculate the equilibrium profits using (S6) and derive
π1 = (p
∗
1 − C)k1 − F =
2(W − C)D
27
− F ,
π2 = (p
∗
2 − C)k2 − F =
5(W − C)D
36
− F ,
π3 = (p
∗
3 − C)(D − k1 − k2)− F =
5(W − C)D
18
− F .
Note, that we have π1 < π2 < π3. In particular firm 1 now has to choose
whether or not it enters the market depending on the entry cost. If the entry
costs are below the critical value Fcrit =
2(W−C)D
27
, it will decide to enter the
market as it expects a positive profit.
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6. Numerical analysis of the N -firm equilibrium
As discussed in the proof of Theorem 2, the exact solution of the optimisation
problem in step (S3) of the algorithm presented in Table 1 gets increasingly
difficult. We are able to derive such exact solution only for N ≤ 4 and present
the respective results in Tables A.2–A.4. In order to get further insight into
the equilibrium for N > 4, we perform a numerical approximation of the
algorithm (S1)–(S6). The code used, to find the approximations presented in
this section can be found in Appendix B. In particular, we are interested in
the equilibrium characteristics for a large number of firms and ultimately in
the limit as N diverges to infinity. The results are plotted in Figure 1. Note
that all the plotted results represent the simplified case where C = 0, W =
D = 1. These can, however, be rescaled for any value of these parameters,
using
p = pˆ(W − C) + C , k = kˆD , π = πˆ(W − C)D ,
where the hats denote variables for C = 0, W = D = 1 presented in Figure 1.
In Figure 1(a), we analyse the capacities chosen by the first moving firm.
We can see that this number converges quickly to a value close to 0.43. This
means that the remaining capacity is shared between an increasing number
of firms and the result can be seen in Figure 1(b), where we present the
remaining quantity for the market incumbent. We see that this quantity
decreases exponentially to 0 as the number of small firms increases. This
falling quantity combined with the constant price for the market incumbent
results in a falling profit, presented in Figure 1(d). Here, we also see the
profits of the (N −1)th and (N −2)th firm. As expected, these also decrease
exponentially to zero and lie a constant factor below the profit of the market
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incumbent. The prices chosen by the first entrant are shown in Figure 1(c).
Again, this price falls exponentially to 0 and results in a decreasing profit for
firm 1. Using this data along with the convergence of k1, one can estimate
the profit of the first moving firm, which can be interpreted as the critical
value of fixed entry costs, above which this firm would not enter the market.
One can now approximately construct a function n(F ) that indicates the
number of firms to be expected in a market with fixed market entry cost F .
7. Discussion
We have shown that the Judo limitation in capacities is an entry strategy
not only for a single entrant competing with a dominant market incumbent
but also for the case of multiple small entrants. We presented an equilibrium
solution concept and discussed some equilibrium properties for the general
case of N firms. For N ≤ 4 firms, the equilibrium prices, capacities and
profits of each firm can be derived analytically. For a higher number of firms
(N > 4), equilibrium outcomes can only be calculated numerically.
We found that for each firm, equilibrium prices do not depend on the
total number of firms but only on the position of the entrant. This compares
to Boyer and Moreaux (1986), who study a Stackelberg game and show that
production of each firm i solely depends on the rank of the firm and not on
the number of firms in the market. Julien et al. (2012) find a similar result
in a multi-stage Stackelberg game with multiple firms in each stage. Output
decisions in each stage only depend on the previous output decisions but do
not depend on the number of followers or following periods.
We have shown that entrants in our game deciding earlier set lower prices,
15
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Figure 1: Numerical approximations of the N -firm equilibrium presented in Theorem 2.
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i.e. prices can be ranked and increase with the rank of a firm within the
competition. This compares to Etro (2008), who shows that with endogenous
entry in a Stackelberg competition with prices, the first moving firm (the
leader) sets a lower price than the (simultaneous moving) followers. At the
same time, entrants deciding early in our game choose higher capacities.
Overall, deciding earlier in this game yields lower profits.
We also found that the ratio of firms’ profits is fixed. This finding is re-
lated to Anderson and Engers (1992), who show that in a hierarchical Stack-
elberg oligopoly each firm earns half its immediate predecessor’s profit (for
linear demand and linear cost). In particular, this compares to our incum-
bent firm earning twice as much profit as the last entrant in our sequential
model.
Individual profits and capacities (of the small entrants) decrease with
an increasing number of entrants. This is in line with Vives (1988) who
models a game with multiple stages where one market incumbent decides
first on its output and then, subsequently, entrants decide whether to enter
the market at fixed market entry cost. He finds that the incumbents profit is
non-increasing in N while total output is increasing in N . At the theoretical
limit of N → ∞ in our model, the first entrant has a price equal to the
marginal cost level and all firms earn zero profits (Appendix B). The finding
that with an infinite number of firms, the market price converges towards
the competitive level is in line with Boyer and Moreaux (1986) and Robson
(1990), who show the same for a Stackelberg game with N firms and linear
cost (Boyer and Moreaux, 1986) and U-shaped average cost (Robson, 1990).
We have restricted our analysis to the case of multiple entrants deciding
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in a sequence (Assumption 1). First, in a price competition model as ours,
the existence of multiple market incumbent as in Vives (1988) is not appro-
priate for the analysis of sequential entry because the incumbents would play
the Bertrand prices at the marginal cost level and thus no room for entrants
would be left. Second, we mentioned in Section 2 that simultaneous moves of
entrants leads to Bertrand prices at the marginal cost level and no capacity
limitation. Thus the market incumbent would always match the price and
thereby deter entry. Moreover, the sequence of our game can be justified by
different arguments. According to Eaton and Ware (1987, p. 14), ”(e)ntry by
its very nature is sequential, and rational entry requires analysis of a sequen-
tial game [. . . ]”. Vives (1988) argues that potential entrants either decide
at different times on entry or, equivalently, some are quicker than others to
respond to entry opportunities. Anderson and Engers (1992) argue that it
is very unlikely that firms actually decide at exactly the same time. They
model a quantity competition where firms can decide whether to reveal their
output decisions or not. In this model, non-revealing would be equivalent to
playing the simultaneous Cournot game (Cournot, 1838). Anderson and En-
gers (1992), however, show that revealing and thus playing the Stackelberg
game is the subgame perfect equilibrium choice.
Assumption 2 (homogeneous products) is crucial for the derivation of our
results. For entrants, capacity limitation is only necessary in the absence
of any horizontal product differentiation. Furth and Kovenock (1993) for
example have shown that in markets with a sequential price competition
and differentiated goods, the first moving firm earns positive profits without
any capacity limitation. In contrast, Assumption 3 (fixed market demand)
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and 5 (constant marginal costs) are not crucial for the equilibrium deriva-
tion, but for the formal solution concept that we presented. However, both
assumptions makes the analytical outcomes more tractable. For settings with
linear demand and more than one entrant, for example, equilibrium prices,
capacities, and profits can only be derived numerically. Assumption 4 (lexico-
graphic preferences) is not crucial, but it makes marginal price cuts obsolete
and thus simplifies the equilibrium derivation. Finally, Gelman and Salop
(1983) show that with efficient rationing the equilibrium structure is similar
to that with proportional rationing but the distribution of profits is altered.
8. Concluding remarks
In this article, we study a game with exogenously given cost structure and
product valuation. We provide a concept to calculate the equilibrium price
choice and profit for each of the firms in the market. Assuming positive mar-
ket entry cost and endogenous firm entry, this implicitly yields the number
of firms in equilibrium.
In our model, we have considered consumers’ product valuation W , fixed
market demand D, and firms’ marginal cost C as exogenously given mar-
ket parameters. Built upon our equilibrium solution concept, it is possible
to study endogenous market parameters in the presented Judo framework.
From Etro (2006), we know that in markets with endogenous entry, the dom-
inant leader can have an incentive to be aggressive. In economic terms, this
means the market leader might invest in cost reduction and/ or demand en-
hancing (e.g. increasing product valuation by increased product quality).
The incumbent’s investment decisions in a setting like ours thus provide a
19
link for future work.
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Appendix B. Numerical approximation of (S1)–(S6)
function equilibrium(N)
% This algorithm looks to calculate the equilibrium of an
% n-Firm judo competition
% Initialisation (S1)
P = [1]; % polynomial
ps(N) = 1; % price choice
qs(N) = 1; % P(ps)
% (S2)--(S3)
for i = N-1:-1:1
P = [-P./(ps(i+1)*qs(i+1)), 1]; % polynomial
ps(i) = min(roots(P.*(length(P):-1:1))); % price choice
qs(i) = polyval(P, ps(i)); % P(ps)
end
% (S4)--(S6)
ks = zeros(1, N);
for i = 1:N
ks(i) = qs(i)*(1 - sum(ks));
disp([’Player ’, num2str(i), ...
’: p = ’, num2str(ps(i)),...
’, k = ’, num2str(ks(i))]);
end
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